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1 Introduction
Inter-municipal cooperation is an old phenomenon that has particularly spread in the
European countries over the last three decades. There are mainly two motives to engage
in cooperation. The prior objective is to provide public services at a lower cost, i.e. to
generate scale economies, or to produce public goods for which municipalities did not
have the critical size to a¤ord it. The second case for inter-municipal cooperation relates
to policy coordination. On the one hand, cooperation among local authorities should aim
at achieving a more equitable resource allocation. In case of an unequal distribution of
tax base across the country, inter-municipal cooperation can reduce scal disparities by
imposing a common tax on the whole tax base located in the member municipalities, and
then redistributing tax revenues. On the other hand, the devolution of tax responsibili-
ties to a higher tier should, by o¤setting externalities within the cooperation structure,
reduces the ine¢ cient race to the bottom that takes place at the municipal level when
municipalities compete to attract mobile tax bases.
In this perspective, France constitutes a very interesting example with a highly frag-
mented territory and very signicant scal disparities. Indeed, France consists of more
than 36,000 municipalities (i.e. 40% of the municipalities in the European Union), which
face a very unequal distribution of tax revenues. This is mainly due to the local business
tax (taxe professionnelle) which accounts for 30% of local tax revenues and whose 80% of
the tax base is concentrated in only 5% of local authorities (about 1800 municipalities).
Public establishments of inter-municipal cooperation (EPCI) have therefore been created
to face this particular situation.
Although the creation of inter-municipal authorities is a phenomenon which started
more than a century ago (Law of the 22nd of March 1890), it is only recently that the
inter-municipal structures have really developed. Among the di¤erent Laws (1992, 1999
and 2004) which promoted this new territorial organization, the Law of the 12th of July
1999, known as the "loi Chevènement", has been a very important one: it was voted
by 80% of the National Assembly and the Senate, which gave it a large legitimacy and
showed that there was a strong will to develop this upper-municipal authority. This Law
has enabled to simplify and to reinforce the inter-municipal cooperation, providing for
instance scal incentives to municipalities. Only three years after the implementation of
the law, more than 800 additional inter-municipal cooperation were created and in this
perspective it was very successful. In 2010, there are 2611 EPCIs, which cover 95% of the
municipalities. However some e¤ects have not been anticipated. The cooperation among
municipalities has been rather based on the resemblance, the cooperation between rich
and poor municipalities being the exception. And whereas a reduction of tax pressure
and of expenses was expected, some argue that the inter-municipal cooperation has led
to the opposite. This is this last issue that we analyze in this paper.
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The EPCIs are subject to common and homogenous rules that are comparable to
those of local authorities and carry di¤erent blocks of competencies. Moreover some of
those structures, on which we focus in this paper, have a tax-levying power. When the
municipalities decide to form an EPCI, they choose between three di¤erent scal regimes:
the additional taxation regime, the single business tax regime (taxe professionnelle unique,
TPU) or the mixed taxation regime. A municipality is mainly nanced by four direct
taxes (known as the "4 vieilles"): the built and unbuilt property tax, the residence tax
and the local business tax. In an additional taxation regime, the EPCI shares the tax
base with the municipalities and can collect the four taxes on his own. In the case of
the single business tax (TPU regime), the municipalities lose one instrument of taxation
which is totally transferred to the inter-municipal level. In a mixed taxation regime, the
EPCI has adopted a TPU regime which is combined with the additional tax on the other
tax bases. In all cases, the municipalities decide jointly the tax rates of the upper-level.
In this framework, the e¤ect of cooperation on tax competition must thus play an
important role to explain the increase of tax pressure. Especially, three mechanisms
have been dened in the literature and will be used to analyze our results. The rst
one refers to vertical tax competition. The co-occupation of a tax base creates vertical
externalities leading to an ine¢ ciently high tax pressure since jurisdictions ignore the
depressive e¤ect that a rise in their tax rate has on the common tax base (Keen (1998),
Hoyt (2001) and Keen and Kotsogiannis (2002)). This e¤ect occurs when a cooperation
structure adopts an additional taxation regime or a mixed taxation regime. The second
mechanism concerns the e¤ect of the number of governments engaged in tax competition
at a given level. It has been shown in the literature that a smaller number of jurisdictions
induces a lower intensity of horizontal tax competition and thus lessen the so-called race
to the bottom (Hoyt (1991)). Thereby, the number of inter-municipal structures being
mechanically lower than the number of municipalities, a taxation at the cooperation level
should reduce the erceness of tax competition, in comparison to municipal taxation.
The third mechanism is also related to horizontal tax competition and is observed when
there is a complete devolution of a tax rate to the inter-municipal level. The mechanical
e¤ect of tax harmonization1 among the member municipalities is to eliminate horizontal
externalities and thus to weaken the e¤ects of horizontal tax competition.
As far as we know, only three empirical papers address the issue of the impact of
the creation of public establishments of inter-municipal cooperation on local taxation in
the case of France. In this aim, Leprince and Guengant (2002) use the model of the
median voter to estimate the scal choices of municipalities from a sample that accounts
for only 10% of the French municipalities. However, the use of cross-sectional data of
year 1997 does not enable them to control the individual xed e¤ect which should play
1See e.g. Burbidge et al. (1997), Itaya et al. (2010) and Konrad and Schjelderup (1999) for a study
of tax harmonization.
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an important role in this analysis. Moreover, only the additional taxation regime is
considered and the e¤ect of cooperation on local taxation is only inferred from the e¤ect
on municipal expenditures which is their dependent variable. Later, Charlot et al. (2008)
investigated the same question using a descriptive analysis (weighted analysis of variance)
for the year 2006 to show that the creation of public establishments of inter-municipal
cooperation is associated with an increase in the four cumulative tax rates, dened as the
sum of the municipal and inter-municipal tax rates. This result strongly depends on the
socio-demographic and economic characteristics of the municipalities (rural/urban status,
number of inhabitants,...) and on the characteristics of the EPCI (scal regime,...). They
go further in their analysis in Charlot et al. (2010) by using a panel data set covering the
1993-2003 period to study the e¤ect of scal cooperation on municipal taxation. Their
panel data set enables them to use spatial and dynamic econometric techniques with a
model of tax setting. In particular, they take into account spatial dependence of tax rates
between municipalities by explaining local tax rates in a municipality by the weighted
tax rates of neighboring municipalities.
In this paper, we extend the literature in two ways. First, we are interested in the
causal e¤ect of the creation of public establishments of inter-municipal cooperation after
the Law of 1999, on local taxation. This requires a specic econometric approach, the
di¤erences in di¤erences. This method consists in studying the e¤ect of a "treatment",
here the creation of EPCI, on an economic variable, here the local taxation. This analysis
thus relies on the construction of a "treated group" and a "control group", to distinguish
between the municipalities who joined an EPCI and the other ones. Since this paper is
then to understand the e¤ect of cooperation on tax pressure, the outcome variables are
the four cumulative tax rates.
Second, we study not only the e¤ect on the level of tax rates but also in terms of
convergence, by looking at the evolution of tax rate dispersion among municipalities
belonging to each EPCI.We use a quasi-exhaustive panel for French municipalities, that
contains information about 36,530 municipalities observed over the 1994-2010 period.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data and how inter-municipal
cooperation is organized in France. Section 3 describes the empirical strategy and section
4 presents the results. Finally, section 5 concludes.
2 The data
2.1 The organization of inter-municipal cooperation in France
France is a unitary country, which is administratively divided into three tiers of juris-
dictions, i.e. 26 regions ("régions") at the top tier, 100 counties ("départements") at
the middle tier, and more than 36,000 municipalities ("communes") at the bottom tier.
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The size of the municipalities varies greatly from one to another: the largest city (Paris)
has more than 2,000,000 inhabitants, whereas 75% of municipalities have less than 1,000
inhabitants. Several initiatives have been made to compensate for this territorial disper-
sion, with the aim of creating more solidarity among municipalities so that they could
satisfy their citizensneed by providing public goods and services that they could not
have a¤orded alone. A rst step was made with the law of 22nd March 1890 by giving
municipalities the option of creating a "syndicat de communes". First designed to man-
age a unique public service like the distribution of water or the collection of household
garbage, these "syndicats de communes" were allowed to manage several public services
of general interest from 1959. For new cities created in the late 60s, special structures
called "syndicats dagglomérations nouvelles" emerged from 1983. A further step was
made in 1992 with the creation of two structures, i.e. the "communautés de communes"
which federate rural municipalities and the "communautés de villes" which feder-
ate cities grouping together more than 20,000 inhabitants. A last step was made in
1999 with the "Loi Chevènement", which has simplied the inter-municipal architecture
around three types of inter-municipal cooperation, i.e. the "communautés de communes"
(CC) established in 1992, the "communautés dagglomération" (CA) which gather more
than 50,000 inhabitants togetherand the "communautés urbaines" (CU) which gather
more than 500,000 inhabitantsand has organized the suppression of the unsuccessful
"communautés de villes" (CV), of the "syndicats dagglomérations nouvelles" (SAN) and
of the "districts". This law has contributed to standardize the rules applicable to the
inter-municipal structures and to simplify the inter-municipal cooperation scene.
Table 1: Evolution of the number of EPCIs depending on their legal status, over the
1994-2010 period
Year CA CC CU CV DISTRICT SAN Total
1994 0 562 9 4 291 9 875
1999 0 1346 12 5 306 9 1678
2005 162 2341 14 0 0 6 2523
2010 181 2408 16 0 0 5 2610
Our analysis exclusively focuses on inter-municipal structures allowed to raise tax
revenues, i.e. "établissements de coopération intercommunale à scalité propre", which
include the "communautés de communes" (CC), the "communautés dagglomération"
(CA), the "communautés urbaines" (CU), the "communautés de villes" (CV), the "syn-
dicats dagglomérations nouvelles" (SAN) and the "districts" (table 1). Table 2 shows
that the development of EPCIs was particularly sustained over the period 1994-2005 and
then has been strongly slower. In 2005, France is well-covered by EPCIs: 88% of the mu-
nicipalities, which represents 86% of the territory and 83% of the population, cooperate
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through an EPCI (table 2). Only 87 EPCIs which will constitute what we will call later
our control groupwere created between 2006 and 2010 (table 1).
Note that old districts and unsuccessful CVs disappeared by being transformed into
CCs or CAs. The SANs have also progressively disappeared by being transformed into
CAs. Most EPCIs are CCs (92% in 2010), owing to the high predominance of rural
municipalities over urban municipalities (85% against 15% of French municipalities).
Table 2: Development of inter-municipal cooperation over the 1994-2010 period
Year % of municipalities in EPCI % of area in EPCI % of pop in EPCI
1994 24,50% 20,65% 36,24%
1999 52,11% 52,32% 54,87%
2005 88,07% 86,42% 83,65%
2010 94,78% 93,15% 88,97%
2.2 The data set
In order to evaluate the impact of inter-municipal cooperation on the level and the dis-
persion of the four cumulative tax rates, we use three data sets.
 The rst one is a quasi-exhaustive panel for French municipalities from the Direction
Générale des Finances Publiques (Ministry of Finance). 36,530 municipalities are
observed over the 1994-2010 period. However, for reasons concerning our empirical
strategy that will be described below, we only keep information on municipalities
over the 1994-2005 period. Besides, some French municipalities are excluded from
the sample. 71 municipalities that merged in the studied period and 9 municipalities
called "villages morts pour la France" which were completely destroyed during the
First World War and administratively kept in memory of the killed inhabitants
are excluded. Because of the lack of reliable information for many variables relative
to overseas territories, we also exclude(d) the 112 overseas municipalities. Overall,
the nal sample contains 438,360 municipality-year observations from 1994 to 2005.
This data set provides information on the level of the tax rates and tax bases of
the four direct municipal taxes ("4 vieilles"): the built and unbuilt property tax,
the residence tax and the local business tax. These tax data are also available at
the inter-municipal level. Note that inter-municipal cooperation is observed over the
larger period 1994-2010, in order to build coherent control groups from structures of
inter-municipal cooperation that will be created over the period 2006-2010. Tables
3 presents the composition of inter-municipal and municipal tax revenues coming
from these "4 vieilles"2. It shows that the composition of tax revenues and its
2Note that most tax revenues are generated by these "4 vieilles". Tax autonomy is relatively high in
France since 45% of the municipal revenues comes from their own tax revenues.
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evolution between 1999 and 2005 is quite similar for municipalities and EPCIs.
We observe that the share of built property taxation and residence taxation in both
municipal and inter-municipal tax revenues has increased over the period 1999-2005
contrary to the one of business taxation and unbuilt property taxation.
 The second data set comes from the Direction Générale des Collectivités Locales
(Ministry of the Interior). It contains information on inter-municipal cooperation
over the 1994-2010 period. More precisely, it gives information on i) when a struc-
ture of inter-municipal cooperation was created, ii) by which municipalities it was
created, iii) which municipalities joined it afterwards, iv) the legal status of the
structure communauté de communes (CC), communauté dagglomération (CA),
communauté urbaine (CU), communauté de ville (CV), syndicat dagglomération
nouvelle (SAN) or districtv) its scal regime (TPU regime, additional taxation
regime or mixed taxation regime). Municipalities that belong to an EPCI can in-
deed choose between three regimes: i) a TPU regime, where only the EPCI levies a
tax rate on the business tax base3, which constitutes its only source of tax revenues;
ii) an additional taxation regime, where municipalities keep their scal sovereignty
on each of the four tax bases. In addition, the EPCI can levy an additional tax
rate on one or several tax bases; iii) a mixed taxation regime where the EPCI has
adopted a TPU regime which is combined with additional taxation on the other
tax bases. This data set also gives information on the "scal capacities" of each
municipality. These scal capacities are a measure of municipalitiespotential tax
revenues, computed by applying the average national tax rates on the four tax bases
of each municipality.
 Three variables used in this paper come from data collected by the French National
Institute of Statistics (INSEE). First, the number of inhabitants in each municipal-
ity is proxied by the population in 1990, 1999 and 2006 obtained from the di¤erent
population census. Second, we use the INSEE classication of municipalities in
terms of rurality (ZAUER classication, i.e. "zoning in urban areas and labor areas
of the rural space") to distinguish rural municipalities from urban ones. We also
use this information to create a variable that denes if an EPCI can be considered
as rural or not. We then establish two denitions: i) a rural EPCI is an EPCI in
which the largest municipality of the EPCI is rural; ii) a rural EPCI is an EPCI in
which more than 50% of the inhabitants live in a rural municipality. Given that the
two denitions give similar results in the estimations, we only keep one variable:
the one created using the second denition. Thirdly, we use the average taxable
income (per inhabitants) of each municipality.
3This business tax, called "taxe professionnelle", was replaced in 2010 by both a tax on the rental
value of properties and a tax on value added.
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Table 3: Share of each tax in the total tax revenues coming from the "4 vieilles", at
the inter-municipal and municipal level
1999 2005
% from built property taxation 27,30% 29,48%
% from unbuilt property taxation 20,14% 18,60%
% from business taxation 26,64% 23,59%
% from residence taxation 25,92% 28,33%
% from built property taxation 28,34% 29,44%
% from unbuilt property taxation 23,17% 21,09%
% from business taxation 21,29% 20,40%
% from residence taxation 27,21% 29,07%
Composition of municipal tax revenues from the "4 vieilles"
Composition of inter-municipal tax revenues from the "4 vieilles"
To sum up, the variables at the municipal level that we have at our disposal are the
following:
- dates of adhesion / withdrawal of a municipality to an EPCI
- the 4 direct tax rates levied at the municipal level (the "4 vieilles")
- the 4 corresponding tax bases
- the distinction rural / urban municipalities
- number of inhabitants in 1990, 1999 and 2006 (from the population census).
- the level of scal capacities
- the level of taxable income
At the EPCI level, our variables are:
- dates of creation / dissolution of an EPCI
- the 4 direct tax rates levied at the EPCI level, if applicable
- the distinction rural / urban EPCI
- the legal status of the EPCI
- the scal regime.
Basic statistics on the population, rurality, scal regime and legal status of the mu-
nicipalities and EPCIs of our sample are presented in table 4. Note that the share of
municipalities in a mixed taxation regime is extremely low
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Table 4: Main characteristics of the municipalities and the EPCIs
1994 1999 2005 Mean
% of rural municipalities 83.7 83.7 83.7 83.7
% of mun. with a population < 500 59.44 58.32 58.32 58.8
% of mun. with 500 <= pop < 2000 28.82 29.36 29.36 29.1
% of mun. with 2000 <= pop < 10000 9.52 10 10 9.8
% of mun. with pop >= 10000 2.22 2.32 2.32 2.28
% of mun. in a CC 15.16 41.34 79.61 47.89
% of mun. in a TPU 4.66 6.08 40.6 23.7
including % in mixed taxation regime 0.2 0.4 5.2 2.5
% of rural EPCI NA 75.28 62.21 65.74
% of EPCIs with pop < 10000 NA 76.4 64.41 67.75
% of EPCIs with 10000 <= pop < 50000 NA 21.35 29.11 26.87
% of EPCIs with pop >= 50000 NA 2.25 6.18 5.21
% of CC in the EPCIs NA 98.88 94.22 95.69
% of the EPCIs in TPU NA 7.87 44.87 33.47
including % in mixed taxation regime NA 0.36 5.66 3.61
Characteristics of municipalities
Characteristics of EPCIs
3 Empirical strategy
3.1 Econometric framework
In order to evaluate the causal e¤ect of inter-municipal cooperation on the level and dis-
persion of the four cumulative tax rates, we use di¤erences-in-di¤erences (DID) estimation
procedures.
The general specication of such models is the following:
Yit = Eit +X
0
it + t + i + "it (1)
i = 1; :::; N ; t = 1; :::; T
where individuals are indexed by i and time is indexed by t. Let t and i be respectively
time and individual xed e¤ects and "it be an unobserved error term. Eit is the "treatment
variable", which takes a value of 0 in all periods prior to the treatment, and a value of 1
in all periods after the treatment. The subscript i for the treatment variable comes from
the fact that the timing of the treatment is not the same for all individuals. This model
also includes additional explanatory variables denoted Xit.
Yit is the outcome variable. We concentrate on two outcomes : i) the level of each of
the 4 cumulative tax rates (hereafter Model 1), i.e. the sum between the municipal and
inter-municipal tax rate; ii) the dispersion of each of the 4 cumulative tax rates among
municipalities belonging to the same EPCI (hereafter Model 2). We measure the impact
of inter-municipal cooperation (Eit) on those two outcomes.
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The parameter of interest is b, the causal e¤ect of the treatment on the outcome
variable, Yit. It measures the di¤erence between the average change in the outcome of
the "treated" (i.e. individuals who receive the treatment) and the average change in the
outcome of the control group (i.e. individuals who do not receive the treatment).
3.2 Model specication, control and treated groups
Although inter-municipal cooperation is observed over the 1994-2010 period in our data-
base (date of the creation of each EPCI, composition of each EPCI, etc.), regressions
are performed over the period 1994-2005. Years 2006 to 2010 are only used to build the
"control group", i.e. the group composed of municipalities which did not join an EPCI
created after the end of the period selected for the regressions. Indeed, this control group
must be large enough for a robust econometric analysis. Since only 10 EPCIs were created
in 2010, we need to enlarge the period, going back to 2006. The control group therefore
contains the 161 EPCIs created from 2006 to 2010. The date of creation of the EPCI
is then used to distinguish between "treated" and "control" groups. The treatment is
dened as the decision for a municipality to join or create an EPCI after 1999, i.e. after
the implementation of the "Loi Chevènement". This section describes more precisely the
construction of these two groups and present the models estimated.
In Model 1, we estimate the impact of inter-municipal cooperation on the level of the
four cumulative tax rates previously dened.
A cumulative tax rate is the sum of the municipal and inter-municipal tax rates chosen
by both the municipality and its EPCI. When a municipality does not belong to an EPCI,
this cumulative tax rate is equal to the municipal tax rate. Note that the cumulative tax
rate will be the sum of both municipal and inter-municipal tax rates in case of tax-base
sharing but will only be the tax rate levied by one-tier in case of TPU regime or without
additional taxation.
The four outcome variables are the levels of the four direct cumulative tax rates: the
cumulative residence tax rate (RT), the cumulative built property tax rate (BPT), the
cumulative unbuilt property tax rate (NBPT) and the cumulative local business tax rate
(LBT). These cumulative tax rates are denoted Tk; with k = RT , BPT , NBPT or LBT .
The model is the following :
log(Tkit) = Eit + t + i + "it (Model 1)
k = RT;BPT;NBPT;LBT ; i = 1; :::; N ; t = 1994; :::; 2005
where k is the cumulative tax rate, i the municipality and t the year.
The treatment variable Eit is the membership of the municipality to an EPCI.
Municipalities belonging to the treated group are municipalities that joined between
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1999 and 2005 an EPCI created over the same period. All municipalities that joined
after 2005 an EPCI created before 2005 are excluded from the sample, as well as all
municipalities that joined an EPCI created before 1999.
Municipalities belonging to the control group are municipalities that joined an EPCI
created after 2005. Note that we also used an alternative control group composed of
municipalities that never joined an EPCI over the 1999-2010 period. Since the estimated
treatment e¤ects are not sensitive to the choice between those two control groups, and
thus to their size, we do not keep this alternative control group, for consistency with the
control group used in Model 2 (we explain this point later on). The description of the
model and the denitions of the di¤erent groups are summarized in table 5. The main
characteristics of municipalities belonging to the treated and control groups are given in
table 6. Municipalities that decided to join or create an EPCI between 1999 and 2005
(treated group) have a lower and also less dispersed level of scal capacities than those
who joined an EPCI after 2005. They also have a lower number of inhabitants. However,
there is no signicant di¤erence between the average level of taxable income between
municipalities belonging to the treated and the control group.
In Model 2, we estimate the impact of the creation of an EPCI on the dispersion of
the four cumulative tax rates among municipalities that belong to the same EPCI. Since
the outcome variable is dened at the EPCI level, the construction of this variable for
the control group, i.e. the group of municipalities who only joined an EPCIs created
between 2006 and 2010, must be carefully explained. The structure of this control group
is imposed by our methodology, as we calculate coe¢ cients of variation of cumulative
tax rates within an EPCI. The control group thus cannot contain municipalities that
never joined an EPCI, because otherwise, we would not have the structure on which to
calculate the coe¢ cients of variation. Therefore, for the municipalities belonging to the
control group, we calculate the outcome variable using the "future" structure of EPCIs,
i.e. the structure of EPCIs that is observed at the time of their creation, which, by
denition of the control group, has to be after 2006. As in the previous model, the
cumulative tax rate considered is either the sum of the municipal and inter-municipal
tax rates or the municipal tax rate, depending on the adhesion of the municipality to
the EPCI. This dispersion is measured using a weighted coe¢ cient of variation4. The
coe¢ cient of variation of the cumulative tax rate Tkjt, calculated over all municipalities
i that belong to the EPCI j in year t is denoted CVkjt: It is computed as follows:
CVkjt =
1
T k;jt
(
NX
i=1
 
Tk;jit   T k;jt
2 Pjit
Pjt
)1=2
4In an EPCI, the size of the di¤erent municipalities can vary greatly from one to another. The het-
erogeneity in terms of population of the di¤erent municipalities belonging to the same EPCI is therefore
taken into account in the weighted coe¢ cient of variation.
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where Pjt is the total number of inhabitants in the EPCI j in year t, Pjit is the number
of inhabitants in municipality i in the EPCI j in year t. Tk;it is the cumulative tax rate
k of municipality i in the EPCI j in year t and T k;jt is the average cumulative tax rate
k measured at the EPCI level, in year t. These coe¢ cients of variation are calculated for
the four cumulative tax rates.
The model is the following:
CVkjt = Ejt + t + j + "jt (Model 2)
k = RT;BPT;NBPT;LBT ; j = 1; :::;M ; t = 1994; :::; 2005
where k is the cumulative tax rate, j the EPCI and t the year.
The treatment variable Ejt is still the creation of an EPCI.
EPCIs belonging to the treated group are EPCIs created between 1999 and 2005. All
EPCI created before 1999 are dropped out of the sample.
The description of the model and the denitions of the di¤erent groups are summarized
in table 5 and the main characteristics of EPCIs belonging to the treated and control
groups are given in table 7. We nd that EPCIs belonging to the treated group have
a lower level of scal capacities than those of the control group. We do not nd any
signicant di¤erence in the average level of taxable income of EPCIs belonging to the
treated or the control group. Note that EPCIs that were created before 2005 (treated
group) are composed of more municipalities and also smaller municipalities (see table 6)
as the average number of inhabitants in both kinds of EPCIs is not signicantly di¤erent.
All these results lead to the intuition that EPCIs created before 2005 were created by
small municipalities that needed to make scale economies.
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Table 5: Description of the two models estimated
MODEL 1 MODEL 2
Level Municipality level EPCI level
Outcome
variable
4 outcomes: the logarithm of 4 different
cumulative tax rates in a municipality at a
given year
4 outcomes : the weighted coefficient of
variation of the 4 different cumulative tax rates
of municipalities belonging to an EPCI at a
given year
Treatment Adhesion between 1999 and 2005 of a
municipality to an EPCI created between 1999
and 2005
Creation of an EPCI between 1999 and 2005
Treated
group
All municipalities that join an EPCI between
1999 and 2005
à number of municipalities: 11 936
à outcome observed over years 1994-2005
à number of observations: 143 232
EPCI created 1999 and 2005
à number of EPCI: 1 034
à outcome observed over years 1994 to 2005
à number of observations: 12 375
Control
group
All municipalities that join an EPCI between
2006 and 2010
à number of municipalities: 1 600
à outcome observed over years 1994 to 2005
à number of observations : 19 200
EPCI created between 2006 and 2010
à number of EPCI : 161
à outcome observed over years 1994 to 2005
à number of observations : 1 936
Table 6: Comparison of the main characteristics of municipalities belonging to the
treated and control groups
Municipalities
belonging to the
treated group
Municipalities
belonging to the
control group
Test for
significant
difference
Number of municipalities
(%)
143,232
(88.2%)
19 200
(11.8%)
-
Economic characteristics
Average fiscal capacities (/hab)
[Q1-Q3]
381.9
[229 - 424]
475.6
[258 - 537]
***
Average taxable income (/hab)
[Q1-Q3]
6,556
[5,510 – 7,664]
6,558
[5,270 – 7,935]
NS
Average unemployment rate 10.6% 10.2% ***
% of executives 3.64% 3.53% ***
% of rural municipalities 85.6% 85.7% NS
Socio-demographic characteristics
Number of inhabitants (mean)
Number of inhabitants (median)
[Q1-Q3]
1,289
329
[156 - 803]
1,636
334
[155 - 807]
***
% of inhabitants aged 60 + 25.6% 26.9% ***
Notes:
i) ***: the means are significantly different at the 5% level; NS: the means are not significantly different.
ii) Q1 and Q3 are the first and third quartiles of the distribution of each variable.
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Table 7: Comparison of the main characteristics of EPCIs belonging to the treated
and control groups
EPCIs belonging to
the treated group
EPCIs belonging to
the control group
Test for
significant
difference
Number of EPCIs
(%)
11,936
(92%)
1,034
(8%)
-
Economic characteristics
Average fiscal capacities (/hab)
[Q1-Q3]
453.8
[313 – 526]
573
[354 – 647]
***
Average taxable income (/hab)
[Q1-Q3]
7 001
[6 026 – 7 681]
7 010
[5 804 – 7 919]
NS
% of rural EPCIs 62% 64.6% ***
Socio-demographic characteristics
Number of municipalities (mean)
[Q1-Q3]
12.1
[7-16]
10
[6-12]
***
Number of inhabitants (mean)
Number of inhabitants (median)
[Q1-Q3]
15 447
6 993
[4 115 – 13 014]
16 085
5 637
[2 823 – 13 253]
NS
Notes:
i) ***: the means are significantly different at the 5% level; NS: the means are not significantly different.
ii) Q1 and Q3 are the first and third quartiles of the distribution of each variable.
3.3 Estimation methodology
Contrary to most studies that perform DID on repeated cross-sections, we use a panel
data set: cumulative tax rates of municipalities and EPCIs are observed over the 1994-
2005 period. Therefore, model (1) can be estimated using classical estimation procedures
relative to panel data models.
The most general specication of the model used for DID can be written as in
model (1). In this model, the individual e¤ect i is likely to be correlated with some
of the explanatory variables of the model, and in particular, with the treatment variable
Eit. Pooled OLS on equation (1) would therefore lead to inconsistent estimates and b
would not be the causal e¤ect of the treatment. Panel data provide means of transform-
ing the model so that the individual xed e¤ect i disappears, as well as the correlation
between this term and Eit. This model can be estimated using the rst-di¤erenced es-
timator or the within-group estimator. The latter is usually preferred, as it gives more
e¢ cient estimates, as long as "it is uncorrelated with the contemporaneous values of Eit
(i.e. corr(Eit; "it) = 0;8i and t).
The estimated model is the following:
(Yit   Yi:) = (Eit   Ei:) + t + ("it   "i:) (2)
i = 1; :::; N ; t = 1994; :::; 2005
where Yi:and Ei: are the individual means and t are time xed e¤ects.
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The estimations of such models rely on the validity of several identifying assumptions.
The rst "fundamental identifying assumption" is that changes (or trends) in the
outcome variable would have been the same for both groups (treated and control groups)
without any treatment. As it is not possible to observe this counterfactual (the evolution
of the outcome for the treated group, in the absence of any treatment), the validity of
this assumption can be checked by looking at the trend in the outcome variable of both
groups in the pre-treatment period. Therefore, for both models, we present the trend of
the outcome variables both before and after treatment. To get robust evidence that both
groups have the same trend before the treatment, we estimate a xed-e¤ect regression
over the pre-treatment period. The explained variable is the outcome and explanatory
variables are time dummies as well as interactions between time dummies and the dummy
that equals 1 if the observation belongs to the treated group. The tests of signicance of
the interaction terms allow us to conclude on whether the outcome of the control group
is signicantly the same as the one of the treated group, or not. We do not present results
of these regressions in this paper, but we comment them.
The second assumption is the absence of any correlation between Eit and the remain-
ing error term "it. The violation of this hypothesis leads to inconsistent estimates of
the treatment e¤ect. However, it is impossible to check empirically the validity of this
hypothesis.
For Bertrand, Duo and Mullainathan (2004), DID estimates are very likely to lead
to an underestimate of standard errors (and therefore a too frequent rejection of the null
hypothesis that the treatment e¤ect is not signicant) if we do not control for the corre-
lation of the error term "it over time for a given individual (municipality or EPCI). This
has to be taken into account in the estimates. The default standard errors assume that
the regression errors are independent and identically distributed (iid). In all estimations
we therefore use standard errors that are clustered at the individual level. Another way
to control part of this serial correlation would be to include the lagged dependent variable
as an explanatory variable. However, this lagged variable is, by construction, correlated
with the error term. It should therefore be instrumented in order to get consistent es-
timates, but instruments can be hard to nd. Note that this serial correlation is very
likely to happen in our case. For example, the coe¢ cient of correlation of the four direct
cumulative tax rates between 2 years is always higher than 0.95.
In addition to the estimation of Model 1 and Model 2, we estimate three more sophis-
ticated models.
First, we add additional explanatory variables in Model 1 and Model 2 in order to con-
trol for characteristics of the municipality or characteristics of the EPCI in the estimation
of the treatment e¤ect. Most characteristics available in the data set are time-invariant
(geographical variables for instance) or only change twice over the period (population
characteristics from the census for instance) so that they cannot be included as covari-
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ates in the regression. However, all scal and economic variables, that are time-varying,
can well explain both the log of the cumulative tax rates and the coe¢ cient of variation
of the cumulative tax rates. We estimate the following models:
log(Tkit) = Eit +X
0
it + t + i + "it (Model 1)
k = RT;BPT;NBPT;LBT ; i = 1; :::; N ; t = 1994; :::; 2005
CVkjt = Ejt +X
0
jt + t + j + "jt (Model 2)
k = RT;BPT;NBPT;LBT ; j = 1; :::;M ; t = 1994; :::; 2005
In Model 1, the vector of the additional explanatory variables Xit contains the log of
the tax base k of municipality i in year t and the log of the scal capacities of municipality
i in year t5. Fiscal capacities are dened in euro 20056 and per inhabitants.
In Model 2, the vector of the additional explanatory variables Xjt contains both the
log of the weighted average and the weighted coe¢ cient of variation of two variables: the
tax base k of the EPCI j in year t and the scal capacities of the EPCI j in year t. It
also contains the log of the EPCI tax rate k.
Secondly, even if time-invariant variables cannot be included as explanatory variables
in Model 1 and Model 2, they can be used to test whether there is an heterogeneity of
the treatment e¤ect between di¤erent sub-groups. We thus include interaction terms in
models Model 1and Model 2and estimate the following models:
log(Tkit) = Eit + (EitIG=A) +X
0
it + t + i + "it (Model 1)
k = RT;BPT;NBPT;LBT ; i = 1; :::; N ; t = 1994; :::; 2005
CVkjt = Ejt + (EjtIG=A) +X
0
jt + t + j + "jt (Model 2)
k = RT;BPT;NBPT;LBT ; j = 1; :::;M ; t = 1994; :::; 2005
where IG=A equals 1 if the municipality (resp. EPCI) belongs to group A (for example,
a rural municipality (resp. a rural EPCI)) and 0 otherwise. The coe¢ cients of such
5Note that we could also have used the log of taxable income of the inhabitants of municipality i:in
year t as an additional explanatory variable. However, descriptive statistics (tables 6 and 7) have shown
that this variable is not signicantly di¤erent between treated and control municipalities/EPCIs. It also
turned out to be unsignicant in all regressions, so we present the results without this variable.
6This monetary variable, as all monetary variable in this chapter, is deated using the national
consumption price index for each year. We rule out the fact that prices may di¤er accross municipalities
and use a national index.
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models must be interpreted carefully:  gives the di¤erence between: i) the average
change in the outcome of individuals who belong to the treated group and who are not
in group A, and ii) the average change in the outcome of individuals belonging to the
control group, whereas  +  gives the di¤erence between: i) the average change in the
outcome of individuals belonging to both the treated group and the category A and ii)
the average change in the outcome of individuals belonging to the control group. Four
time-invariant characteristics have been used in the regressions : i) the legal status of
the EPCI ("Communauté de Communes" or not); ii) the scal regime of the EPCI (TPU
regime, mixed taxation regime, additional taxation regime); iii) if the municipality/EPCI
is rural or not; iv) the number of inhabitants in the municipality/EPCI. In order to
understand the results of Model 1and Model 2, table 8 gives more details about the
scal and economic characteristics of the municipalities or EPCIs belonging to the treated
group, depending on these four constant characteristics. It shows for example that EPCIs
who choose an additional taxation regime are composed of municipalities that are rather
homogeneous in terms of scal potential and size of the population, whereas municipalities
who opt for a TPU regime are more heterogeneous.
Thirdly, we allow the treatment e¤ects to vary over time as in Laporte andWindmeijer
(2005). The specications of Model 1 and Model 2 rely on the assumption that the e¤ect
of the treatment is immediate : when the variable Eit (resp. Ejt) switches from 0 to 1,
it is accompanied by a change in log(Tkit) (resp. CVkjt) of an amount b. In our case, the
e¤ect of inter-municipal cooperation is likely to increase over time, which leads us to use
a more exible model in which we allow the treatment e¤ect to vary over time. To do so,
we include in the model variables relative to the number of years that passed since the
treatment. More precisely, the specication is the following :
log(Tkit) = Eit +
2005 daijX
=1
dIit+ +X
0
it + t + i + "it (Model 1)
k = RT;BPT;NBPT;LBT ; i = 1; :::; N ; t = 1994; :::; 2005;
daij = date of adhesion of i to EPCI j
CVkjt = Ejt +
2005 dcjX
=1
dIjt+ +X
0
jt + t + j + "jt (Model 2)
k = RT;BPT;NBPT;LBT ; j = 1; :::;M ; t = 1994; :::; 2005;
dcj = date of creation of EPCI j
where Iit+ equals 1 if  years passed since the individual received the treatment for the
rst time. Therefore, b + bd gives the impact of the treatment  years after the rst year
of the treatment.
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Table 8: Main characteristics of the municipalities and the EPCIs belonging to the
treated groups
Municipalities belonging to the treated
group
EPCIS belonging to the treated group
Rural Status Rural Non Rural Test for
signif. diff
Rural Non Rural Test for
signif. diff
Average fiscal potential
(/inhab., €2005)
Coeff. Variation
356
1.06
533
0.67
*** 402
0.54
538
0.38
***
Average taxable income
(/inhab., €2005)
Coeff. Variation
6,311
0.38
8,027
0.27
*** 6,562
0.21
7,718
0.24
***
Number of inhabitants
Coeff. Variation
422
1.04
6,360
2.36
*** 5,903
0.75
31,040
1.58
***
% TPU 32% 59% *** 26% 49% ***
% CC 98% 81.6% *** 99.9% 87% ***
Fiscal status TPU ADD TPU ADD
Average fiscal potential
(/inhab., €2005)
Coeff. Variation
405
1.32
362
0.72
*** 476
0.49
441
0.49
***
Average taxable income
(/inhab., €2005)
Coeff. Variation
6,947
0.32
6,246
0.39
*** 7,252
0.22
6,866
0.25
***
Number of inhabitants
Coeff. Variation
2,292
4.20
643
2.89
*** 26,960
1.88
9,278
1.42
***
% Rural 77% 91% *** 47% 70% ***
% CC 87% 99% *** 88% 98% ***
Legal status CC Not CC CC Not CC
Average fiscal potential
(/inhab., €2005)
Coeff. Variation
375
1.01
529
0.80
*** 443
0.49
653
0.36
***
Average taxable income
(/inhab., €2005)
Coeff. Variation
6,471
0.37
8,379
0.31
*** 6,913
0.23
8,634
0.32
***
Number of inhabitants
Coeff. Variation
860
3.21
10,071
2.38
*** 10,029
1.22
116,571
0.75
***
% Rural 87% 41% *** 65% 1.3% ***
% TPU 33% 90% *** 32% 81% ***
Population Pop < 2,000 Pop ³ 2,000 Pop < 10,000 Pop ³ 10,000
Average fiscal potential
(/inhab., €2005)
Coeff. Variation
360
0.63
567
1.05
*** 413
0.54
530
0.39
***
Average taxable income
(/inhab., €2005)
Coeff. Variation
6,396
0.38
7,959
0.28
*** 6,598
0.22
7,758
0.24
***
% CC 97% 77% *** 99.9% 85.6% ***
% Rural 94% 11% *** 82% 24% ***
% TPU 32% 64% *** 25% 53% ***
Notes: ***: the means are significantly different at the 5% level
4 Results
4.1 First model : the impact of inter-municipal cooperation on
the level of the four cumulative tax rates
4.1.1 Trends of the four cumulative tax rates: comparison between the
treated and the control groups
Figure 1 displays the evolution of the four cumulative tax rates for both control and
treated groups, over the 1994-2005 period. A vertical line is added for year 1999, which
is the year from which a municipality can be "treated". Whatever the cumulative tax
rate, the evolution between 1994 and 1999 is similar between the treated and the control
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group. The estimates7 conrm that, prior to 1999, the evolutions of the outcomes for
both groups are not signicantly di¤erent. This result is consistent with the identifying
assumption needed to perform DID estimations. Figure 1 also shows that the treatment
had a strong impact on the evolution of all average cumulative tax rates. For municipalities
that joined an EPCI, all four cumulative tax rates increased signicantly after 1999.
Consequently, as the residence tax rate and the built property tax rate were already
higher for municipalities belonging to the treated group, the discrepancy between taxes
of both groups increased with time. And although the local business tax rate and the
unbuilt property tax rate of municipalities belonging to the control group were higher
than those of the treated group before the treatment, the increase consecutive to the
adhesion to an EPCI has been so strong that, at the end of the period, these tax rates
become even higher for municipalities belonging to the treated group.
Figure 1: Evolution of the four cumulative tax rates between 1994 and 2005 for
control and treated groups
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4.1.2 Results of the estimations
The rst results of the estimation of Model 1 are presented in table 9. All estimated models
include time and municipality dummies that are not reported. For municipalities, joining
an EPCI leads to a signicant increase in all cumulative tax rates. For example, joining
7The model estimated is described in the previous section.
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an EPCI leads to a 8.7% increase in the built property tax. The e¤ects are relatively close
for all cumulative tax rates although we notice a higher increase for the built property
tax and the residence tax.
The treatment e¤ect is slightly modied for the local business tax when control vari-
ables are added (Model 1). Controlling for scal capacities and the size of the tax base
increases the impact of inter-municipal cooperation on the local business tax while we
observe the same positive impact on the three other cumulative tax rates. The estimation
also shows the expected result that a higher tax rate is levied in municipalities with a
smaller tax base. As noticed in the introduction, the tax base of the local business tax
is extremely unevenly distributed across the country compared to the other tax bases.
80% of the tax base is concentrated in only 5% of local authorities, and thus most of
the municipalities have a small tax base combined with a high tax rate. Moreover,
all other things being equal, a relative increase of the cumulative tax rate induced by
inter-municipal cooperation must decrease with the municipal tax rate observed before
cooperation. Therefore, controlling for the tax base, the treatment e¤ect increases.
Moreover, we note that in the four regressions, the log of the scal capacity have the
negative expected impact on the cumulative tax rate since the higher the tax base and
thus the higher the scal capacity, the lower the tax rate will be required to nance a
given amount of expenditures.
Table 9: Estimation of Model 1 and Model 1
Without any control variables With control variables
Log
(BPT)
Log
(NBPT)
Log
(LBT)
Log
(RT)
Log
(BPT)
Log
(NBPT)
Log
(LBT)
Log
(RT)
Eit 0.087*** 0.065*** 0.062*** 0.082*** 0.087*** 0.065*** 0.076*** 0.082***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Log (tax
base/hab)
- - - - -0.013
(0.010)
-0.012**
(0.006)
-0.013***
(0.002)
0.024**
(0.009)
Log (fiscal
capacities/hab)
- - - - -0.077***
(0.008)
-0.073***
(0.006)
-0.081***
(0.011)
-0.096***
(0.007)
Year
dummies
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Municipality
dummies
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
N 161,633 161,520 156,847 161,704 152,598 152,318 145,885 152,745
Within R2 0.35 0.28 0.07 0.37 0.35 0.29 0.10 0.38
Notes :
i) Standard errors in parentheses. They are corrected for clustering on the municipalities.
ii) * means  that p<.1, ** means that p<.05, *** means that p<.01.
iii) BPT stands for the built property tax; NBPT is the unbuilt property tax; LBT is the local business tax and RT stands for
the residence tax.
In order to check whether treatment e¤ects are constant over time, we re-estimate
Model 1 with a treatment variable that varies over time (Model 1). The results of these
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estimates are presented in gure 2. We nd that joining an EPCI has an immediate e¤ect
on all cumulative tax rates, but that the e¤ect increases with time, for all tax rates except
the local business tax. In addition, the older the EPCI, the more competencies are likely
to be transferred, which may be a reason for the increase of taxation over time. The at
pattern observed for the local business tax is entirely explained by the introduction of the
tax base in the regression. Without this explanatory variable, the e¤ect of the treatment
increases over time, as this is the case for the other three tax rates.
The scal adjustment thus appears to be very progressive. The fact that the evolutions
of the four tax rates are linked and restricted by law may explain this progressive increase
of the cumulative tax rates. The di¤erence between the pattern observed for the local
business tax and the other three cumulative tax rates could be explained by the fact that
the local business tax base is more mobile than the other tax bases. Therefore, when it
is possible, the increase of tax pressure is applied to the other tax bases.
Figure 2: Representation of the time-varying e¤ect of the treatment
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We then add interaction e¤ects in order to measure whether the treatment e¤ect is
the same for di¤erent groups of municipalities (Model 1). The results are presented in
tables 10 and 11.
The rurality clearly worsens the inationary impact of the creation of an EPCI on the
cumulative tax rates (except for the local business tax). For instance, joining an EPCI
increases the built property tax by 4.5% for urban municipalities against 8.8% for rural
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ones. Table 8 shows that 98% of rural municipalities joined CCs8, which explains that
belonging to a CC also increases all cumulative tax rates (except for the local business
tax). We expect that inter-municipal cooperation enables the provision of a wider range of
public services. This e¤ect, known as the "zoo" e¤ect (Oates (1988)) should particularly
important for rural municipalities which, alone, could not produce public goods at a large
scale.
We then nd that the e¤ect of joining an EPCI decreases with the size of the mu-
nicipality (for all cumulative tax rates except the local business tax). Two explanations
can be provided for this result. The rst one is in line with the theoretical literature.
According to Wilson (1991), in a tax competition model between jurisdictions with dif-
ferent sizes, the smaller one is more exposed to the e¤ect of tax competition and should
set a lower tax rate. Therefore, the creation of an EPCI that lessens tax competition
should induce an increase of tax rates in small jurisdictions relatively to tax rates in
larger jurisdictions The second intuition for the result comes from the fact that, before
becoming members of an EPCI, small municipalities often beneted from public goods
or services provided by neighboring larger municipalities without contributing to their
nancing. Therefore larger municipalities benet from the creation of an EPCI which
enables to mutualize resources in order to provide public services that they municipali-
ties were producing alone before. This should lead to a decrease of municipal tax rate in
these municipalities on the contrary to small municipalities. Indeed, the membership of
a small municipality to an EPCI could even force it to contribute more to the funding
of public expenditures than it would have done otherwise, resulting in the increase of its
tax rates. This mechanism, which should be even stronger when scale economies can be
realized at the inter-municipal level, refers to the idea of "connected vessels" proposed
by Leprince and Guengant (2002).
Finally, choosing an additional taxation regime worsens the inationary e¤ect on all
cumulative tax rates. The e¤ect of a mixed taxation regime is slightly lower. Table 10
also shows that choosing a single business tax regime has positive impact on cumulative
tax rates. However, except for the local business tax, the e¤ect is very small although
signicant. Joining an EPCI with an additional taxation regime leads to a 10.9% increase
in the residence tax while this gure goes down to 1.5% for municipalities who joined
EPCIs with a single business tax regime. These results are consistent with the literature
on tax competition. Indeed, the adoption of an additional taxation regime or a mixed
taxation regime induces vertical externalities, which is supposed to push up the tax rates.
In a mixed taxation regime and in a TPU regime, an increase of the business tax rate is
also expected due to the harmonization of this tax rate within the EPCI, which lessens
8This high proportion of rural municipalities in CCs is mechanical and is due to the denition of
the other types of EPCIs. CA ("Communautés dAgglomération") and CU ("Communautés Urbaines")
must respectively group together more than 50,000 inhabitants and more than 500,000 inhabitants all in
one piece.
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horizontal tax competition on this tax. The very small e¤ect on the other tax rates
chosen exclusively by the municipalities could then be explained by an indirect e¤ect of
externalities due for instance to some interdependence of the tax bases.
These results contradict the one of Charlot et al. (2010) who nd, using a similar
panel data set (1993-2003), that tax rates are higher in EPCIs who choose the single
business tax regime or the mixed taxation regime. However the di¤erence between the
two results may be due to the fact that their empirical analysis is based on the four
municipal tax rates and not the cumulative tax rates.
It is interesting to note that, even without including any other explanatory variables
than the treatment e¤ect, the explanatory power of the model is already quite high. For
example, 37% of the within variation of the logarithm of the residence tax is explained
by our simplest model (table 9). The explanatory power of the model does not increase
very much with the use of explanatory variables or interaction variables (tables 10 or 11).
To sum up, our results show that inter-municipal cooperation leads to an increase in
the four cumulative tax rates. This nding is consistent with administrative reports (see
for example Dallier (2006)) that have already mentioned this inationary e¤ect as one
important drawback of the inter-municipal cooperation. We nd that tax increase is higher
for rural and/or small municipalities, municipalities that belong to a "Communauté de
Communes" or municipalities who choose an additional taxation regime. Table 8 shows
that these characteristics are strongly linked. For example, 98% of rural municipalities
joined a CC, 91% of municipalities that chose an additional taxation regime are rural
and 67% of municipalities in a CC chose an additional taxation regime. However, if this
analysis gives a clear result on the e¤ect of inter-municipal cooperation on local taxation,
they do not give any information about the relative evolution of the tax rates within an
EPCI. This is then the topic of the next section.
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Table 10: Estimation of Model 1with interaction e¤ects
Interactions with legal status Interactions with fiscal regime
Log
(BPT)
Log
(NBPT)
Log
(LBT)
Log
(RT)
Log
(BPT)
Log
(NBPT)
Log
(LBT)
Log
(RT)
Eit 0.027*** 0.023*** 0.134*** 0.018*** 0.122*** 0.091*** 0.083*** 0.114***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.015) (0.005) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Eit * CC 0.063*** 0.045*** -0.062*** 0.068*** - - - -
(0.006) (0.005) (0.015) (0.005)
Eit  * TPU - - - - -0.109*** -0.081*** -0.018** -0.099***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.008) (0.003)
Eit  * mixed
taxation
- - - - -0.021***
(0.008)
-0.010
(0.007)
-0.066***
(0.021)
-0.005
(0.008)
Log (tax
base/hab)
-0.016*
(0.010)
-0.014**
(0.006)
-0.013***
(0.002)
0.017*
(0.009)
-0.025***
(0.009)
-0.017***
(0.006)
-0.013***
(0.002)
0.006
(0.009)
Log (fiscal
capacities/hab)
-0.073***
(0.008)
-0.071***
(0.006)
-0.084***
(0.011)
-0.091***
(0.007)
-0.057***
(0.008)
-0.061***
(0.006)
-0.077***
(0.011)
-0.077***
(0.007)
Year
dummies
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Municipality
dummies
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
N 152,598 152,318 145,885 152,745 152,598 152,318 145,885 152,745
Within R2 0.36 0.29 0.10 0.38 0.39 0.31 0.10 0.40
Notes :
i) Standard errors in parentheses. They are corrected for clustering on the municipalities.
ii) * means  that p<.1, ** means that p<.05, *** means that p<.01.
iii) BPT stands for the built property tax; NBPT is the unbuilt property tax; LBT is the local business tax and RT stands for
the residence tax.
Table 11: Estimation of Model 1with interaction e¤ects
Interactions with rural Interactions with population
Log
(BPT)
Log
(NBPT)
Log
(LBT)
Log
(RT)
Log
(BPT)
Log
(NBPT)
Log
(LBT)
Log
(RT)
Eit 0.044*** 0.043*** 0.073*** 0.041*** 0.113*** 0.082*** 0.083*** 0.105***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003)
Eit * Rural 0.050*** 0.027*** 0.003 0.048***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004)
Eit  * pop 500 to
2000
- - - - -0.062***
(0.004)
-0.040***
(0.003)
-0.005
(0.007)
-0.052***
(0.004)
Eit  * pop 2000
to 10000
- - - - -0.078***
(0.005)
-0.048***
(0.005)
-0.034***
(0.009)
-0.075***
(0.005)
Eit  * pop >
10000
- - - - -0.110***
(0.007)
-0.081***
(0.006)
-0.141***
(0.016)
-0.120***
(0.006)
Log (tax
base/hab)
-0.017*
(0.010)
-0.014**
(0.006)
-0.013***
(0.002)
0.013
(0.009)
-0.022**
(0.010)
-0.017***
(0.006)
-0.014***
(0.002)
-0.001
(0.009)
Log (fiscal
capacities/hab)
-0.075***
(0.008)
-0.073***
(0.006)
-0.081***
(0.011)
-0.093***
(0.007)
-0.072***
(0.008)
-0.071***
(0.006)
-0.079***
(0.011)
-0.086***
(0.007)
Year
dummies
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Municipality
dummies
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
N 152,598 152,318 145,885 152,745 152,598 152,318 145,885 152,745
Within R2 0.36 0.29 0.10 0.38 0.37 0.29 0.10 0.39
Notes :
i) Standard errors in parentheses. They are corrected for clustering on the municipalities.
ii) * means  that p<.1, ** means that p<.05, *** means that p<.01.
iii) BPT stands for the built property tax; NBPT is the unbuilt property tax; LBT is the local business tax and RT stands for
the residence tax.
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4.2 Second model : the impact of inter-municipal cooperation
on the dispersion of the cumulative tax rates among munic-
ipalities belonging to the same EPCI
4.2.1 Trends of the dispersion of the four cumulative tax rates: comparison
between the treated and the control groups
In this second model, we examine tax rate dispersion among municipalities belonging to
the same EPCI. Tax rate dispersion is measured using weighted coe¢ cients of variation.
Figure 3 displays the evolution of the average coe¢ cients of variation calculated for the
four cumulative tax rates over the 1994-2005 period, both for control and treated groups.
Overall, we observe a continuous convergence of tax rates over the whole period. However,
this trend is more denite for municipalities who decided to join an EPCI. Whereas the
evolution of the coe¢ cients of variation is similar for both groups before 1999 (for all
cumulative tax rates, a regression shows that the trends of the coe¢ cients of variation are
not signicantly di¤erent for the treated and the control groups), the disparities decrease
at a much higher rate after 1999 in the treated group: belonging to an EPCI leads to
higher convergence of tax rates. Moreover, we notice that this decrease is stronger for
the local business tax while it is less important for the built and unbuilt property taxes
as well as the residence tax.
Figure 3: Evolution of the weighted coe¢ cients of variation of the four tax rates,
between 1994 and 2005, both for control and treated groups
.2
.2
4
.2
8
.3
2
.3
6
.4
CV
(lo
ca
l b
us
ine
ss
 ta
x)
1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004
Year
Contro l group Treated Group
Local business tax
.2
4
.2
6
.2
8
.3
.3
2
.3
4
.3
6
C
V(
re
sid
en
ce
 ta
x)
1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004
Year
Contr ol group Treated Group
Residence tax
.2
4
.2
6
.2
8
.3
.3
2
.3
4
.3
6
CV
(u
nb
ui
lt p
ro
pe
rty
 ta
x)
1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004
Year
Contro l group Treated Group
Unbuilt property tax
.2
9
.3
1
.3
3
.3
5
.3
7
.3
9
.4
1
C
V(
bu
ilt 
pr
op
er
ty 
tax
)
1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004
Year
Contr ol group Treated Group
Built property tax
25
4.2.2 Results of the estimations
The results of the estimation of the simplest model (Model 2) are presented in table
12; this model does not contain any interaction e¤ects and the e¤ect of the treatment
is supposed to be constant over the years. As for Model 1, Model 2 includes time and
EPCI dummies that are not reported. We nd that joining an EPCI has a positive
and signicant impact on the convergence of all cumulative tax rates, and especially
on the local business tax rate9. The comparison of Model 1 and Model 1has shown
that introducing explanatory variables did not have much inuence on the estimation
of the treatment e¤ect. In this model, however, adding covariates has a strong impact
on the results. First, the explanatory power of the models, measured by the Within R2,
increases. Then, the impact of joining an EPCI on the convergence of all tax rates is
strongly reduced. This reduction is mainly due to the impact of the most signicant
variable in these regressions: the log of the EPCI tax rate. This variable has a negative
impact on the dispersion of the cumulative tax rates. This e¤ect is mechanical, coming
from the denition of a coe¢ cient of variation. All other things being equal, adding
the same inter-municipal tax rate to all municipal tax rates within an EPCI leads to a
decrease of the coe¢ cient of variation.
The regression also shows that the higher the heterogeneity of the tax base, measured
by the coe¢ cient of variation of the tax base, the higher the dispersion of tax rates. We
have seen in the previous section that the level of the tax base has an impact on the choice
of the level of tax rates. Therefore, di¤erent sizes of tax bases should lead to di¤erent
scal decisions.
The estimation of Model 2, that allows the treatment e¤ects to vary over time shows
that, for all taxes, the convergence of tax rates increases over time. However, when
explanatory variables are added to the regression (and especially the log of the EPCI
tax rate), the e¤ect of these "pulse variables" is not signicant anymore, i.e. joining an
EPCI has only an immediate impact on the convergence of tax rates, except for the local
business tax (gure 4).
9For all estimates, the convergence of the local business tax rate is only measured for EPCIs that
chose an additional taxation regime, since the coe¢ cient of variation of the local business tax for EPCIs
that chose the single business tax regime is zero by construction.
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Table 12: Estimation of Model 2 and Model 2
Without any control variables With control variables
CV
(BPT)
CV
(NBPT)
CV
(LBT)
CV
(RT)
CV
(BPT)
CV
(NBPT)
CV
(LBT)
CV
(RT)
Eit -0.035*** -0.026*** -0.060*** -0.030*** -0.019*** -0.009*** -0.046*** -0.026***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
CV (tax
base/hab)
- - - - 0.010
(0.012)
0.040
(0.029)
0.010**
(0.006)
0.096**
(0.048)
Log (EPCI tax
rate)
- - - - -0.043***
(0.005)
-0.016***
(0.002)
-0.036***
(0.005)
-0.036***
(0.005)
CV (fiscal
capacities/hab)
- - - - -0.027
(0.020)
0.010
(0.015)
0.0005
(0.024)
-0.021
(0.019)
Year
dummies
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
EPCI
dummies
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
N 14,074 14,074 9,724 14,082 14,057 14,057 9,707 14,065
Within R2 0.18 0.12 0.27 0.18 0.25 0.15 0.31 0.23
Notes :
i) Standard errors in parentheses. They are corrected for clustering on the EPCIs.
ii) * means  that p<.1, ** means that p<.05, *** means that p<.01.
iii) BPT stands for the built property tax; NBPT is the unbuilt property tax; LBT is the local business tax and RT stands for
the residence tax.
Figure 4: Representation of the time-varying e¤ect of the treatment
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The intuition behind this general result of convergence of the tax rates within an
EPCI comes from the previous results and conrm the idea of "connected vessels" sug-
gested by Leprince and Guengant (2002). When joining an EPCI, the contribution to
the cooperation level should lead small municipalities to increase more their tax rates
than the larger municipalities would do. As a consequence, a convergence of tax rates
is expected, which should be even stronger when the heterogeneity before cooperation is
high.
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The estimation of Model 2that uses interaction e¤ects shows that the convergence of
tax rates di¤ers according to the characteristics of the EPCI. We then allow the treatment
e¤ect to depend on whether the EPCI is rural or not10, on the legal status of the EPCI,
on its scal regime and on the size of the coe¢ cient inhabitants in the EPCI. The results
are presented in tables 13 and 14.
From table 13, we see that there is a strong convergence of tax rates for EPCIs that
chose an additional taxation regime, for every local taxes, and this e¤ect is not signi-
cantly di¤erent for the EPCIs with a mixed taxation regime. However the convergence is
lower for EPCIs that choose a single business tax regime, but still signicant. The hetero-
geneity of municipalities should be reected in their level of public expenditures and/or
in their local tax rates. Therefore, the result can be explained by the fact that choosing
a single business tax regime implies the loss of a tax instrument for the municipalities
and thus, the heterogeneity of scal decisions can only be distributed among the three
taxes left at the municipal level which increases the coe¢ cient of variation. However, this
result goes against the main reason of the implementation of TPU regime. Indeed, this
scal regime has been mainly created to address the issue of scal disparities due to the
uneven distribution of the business tax base. Therefore, a stronger nancial solidarity
between municipalities within an EPCI should have induced a higher convergence of tax
rates.
In table 14, interactions with the coe¢ cient of variation of the municipal population
shows an increasing e¤ect of convergence with the heterogeneity of the EPCIs in terms
of population. It thus conrms the intuition we already outlined before. We expect that
cooperation lessens tax competition especially for the smaller municipalities, resulting
in a relatively higher increase of tax rates in the municipalities with a relatively lower
population (see table 11). Therefore, the creation of an EPCI composed of municipalities
of similar sizes, i.e. with a low coe¢ cient of variation, has a much smaller e¤ect or
not signicant e¤ect (in the case property taxes) on the convergence of tax rates since
homogeneous municipalities in terms of sizes see an increase of their cumulative tax rates
in the same proportion. On the opposite, table 14 suggests that the e¤ect of cooperation
on convergence is important when the EPCI is characterized by a very heterogeneous
population.
Finally, no signicant di¤erences of the cooperation e¤ect are found according to the
legal or rural status. This may be explained by the composition of these sub-groups. For
instance, rural EPCIs are on average more homogeneous in terms of population while
non-rural EPCIs adopt more often a TPU regime (see table 8). As noticed before, these
characteristics both reduce the e¤ect on convergence which should thus explain that the
total treatment e¤ect is the same.
10We have dened as rural, an EPCI in which more than 50% of the inhabitants live in a rural
municipality.
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Table 13: Estimation of Model 2with interaction e¤ects
Interactions with legal status Interactions with fiscal regime
CV
(BPT)
CV
(NBPT)
CV
(LBT)
CV
(RT)
CV
(BPT)
CV
(NBPT)
CV
(RT)
Eit -0.019* -0.009 -0.065*** -0.026* -0.025*** -0.010*** -0.033***
(0.011) (0.007) (0.005) (0.014) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Eit * CC 0.000 -0.001 0.019*** 0.000 - - -
(0.011) (0.007) (0.006) (0.014)
Eit * TPU - - - - 0.016*** 0.002 0.023***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Eit * mixed
taxation
- - - - 0.013
(0.009)
0.003
(0.007)
0.001
(0.015)
CV (tax
base/hab)
0.010
(0.012)
0.040
(0.029)
0.010*
(0.006)
0.096**
(0.048)
0.010
(0.012)
0.040
(0.030)
0.095**
(0.048)
Log (EPCI tax
rate)
-0.043***
(0.005)
-0.016***
(0.002)
-0.036***
(0.005)
-0.036***
(0.005)
-0.039***
(0.004)
-0.016***
(0.003)
-0.034***
(0.004)
CV (fiscal
capacities/hab)
-0.027
(0.020)
0.010
(0.015)
0.000
(0.024)
-0.021
(0.019)
-0.022
(0.020)
0.013
(0.015)
-0.013
(0.019)
Year
dummies
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
EPCI
dummies
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
N 14,057 14,057 9,707 14,065 13,934 13,934 13,939
Within R2 0.25 0.15 0.31 0.23 0.26 0.15 0.23
Notes :
i) Standard errors in parentheses. They are corrected for clustering on the EPCIs.
ii) * means  that p<.1, ** means that p<.05, *** means that p<.01.
iii) BPT stands for the built property tax; NBPT is the unbuilt property tax; LBT is the local business tax and RT stands for
the residence tax.
Table 14: Estimation of Model 2with interaction e¤ects
Interactions with rural Interactions with population
CV
(BPT)
CV
(NBPT)
CV
(LBT)
CV
(RT)
CV
(BPT)
CV
(NBPT)
CV
(LBT)
CV
(RT)
Eit -0.019*** -0.012*** -0.038*** -0.028*** -0.017*** -0.009** -0.047*** -0.026***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.009) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
Eit * Rural 0.001 0.004 -0.011 0.004 - - - -
(0.006) (0.006) (0.011) (0.007)
Eit *
low_CV(pop)
- - - - 0.018***
(0.005)
0.011***
(0.004)
0.013
(0.010)
0.020***
(0.005)
Eit *
high_CV(pop)
- - - - -0.023**
(0.009)
-0.010
(0.008)
-0.009
(0.012)
-0.017*
(0.009)
CV (tax
base/hab)
0.010
(0.012)
0.040
(0.029)
0.010*
(0.006)
0.095**
(0.048)
0.006
(0.011)
0.039
(0.029)
0.010*
(0.006)
0.076
(0.048)
Log (EPCI tax
rate)
-0.043***
(0.005)
-0.017***
(0.003)
-0.035***
(0.005)
-0.037***
(0.005)
-0.043***
(0.004)
-0.017***
(0.003)
-0.037***
(0.005)
-0.037***
(0.005)
CV (fiscal
capacities/hab)
-0.027
(0.020)
0.010
(0.015)
-0.001
(0.025)
-0.021
(0.019)
-0.025
(0.020)
0.010
(0.015)
0.002
(0.025)
-0.020
(0.019)
Year
dummies
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
EPCI
dummies
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
N 14,074 14,074 9,724 14,082 14,057 14,057 9,707 14,065
Within R2 0.18 0.12 0.27 0.18 0.26 0.15 0.31 0.24
Notes :
i) Standard errors in parentheses. They are corrected for clustering on the EPCIs.
ii) * means  that p<.1, ** means that p<.05, *** means that p<.01.
iii) BPT stands for the built property tax; NBPT is the unbuilt property tax; LBT is the local business tax and RT stands for
the residence tax.
iv) Low CV(pop) (resp. High CV(pop)) means that the coefficient of variation of the number of inhabitants in the EPCI is
lower (resp. higher) than the 1st quartile (resp. the 3rd quartile) of the distribution of the coefficient of variation of the number
of inhabitants.
5 Conclusion
Cooperation among the French municipalities clearly leads to an increase in each of
the four cumulative tax rates over the period 1999-2005. As a consequence of scal
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integration, this e¤ect becomes stronger with time. The highest tax rises are observable
in small and rural municipalities, where cooperation has often been an opportunity to
launch important investment projects. The comparison between the three scal regimes
o¤ered to municipalities in EPCIs (i.e. the additional taxation regime, the single business
tax regime and the mixed taxation regime) shows that the additional taxation regime
worsens the inationary e¤ect on all cumulative tax rates. This is thus consistent with
the prediction of the theoretical literature on tax competition. However, we cannot rule
out a problem of accountability that could occur with cooperation. Indeed, in the French
case, inter-municipal assemblies are composed of members who are not directly elected
since they are representatives of each member municipality. Each one is designed by
the elected incumbents of its municipality. Therefore, there is a scope for a leviathan
behaviour at the inter-municipal level, that could also explain the overtaxation.
The study of tax rate convergence among municipalities that belong to the same
EPCI measured by weighted coe¢ cients of variationbrings new insights as it shows
that cooperation leads to a higher convergence of each cumulative tax rate, and especially
the local business tax rate. Contrary to the results obtained on the level of the cumulative
tax rates, we nd that the convergence of tax rates is not signicantly di¤erent between
rural EPCI and non rural EPCI. We also nd that, for all cumulative tax rates, the
convergence of tax rates is higher for EPCIs that chose an additional or mixed taxation
regime than for those who chose a single business tax regime. This suggests that with
due to the loss of one of their tax instruments, municipalities in a TPU regime face their
heterogeneity by di¤erencing even more their remaining tax rates. Finally, the results
found for the analysis on the level of tax rates provide an explanation of the increasing
convergence with the heterogeneity in terms of population. The creation of an EPCI
leads to a higher increase of tax rates for its smaller municipalities than for its larger
ones, which thus results in a higher convergence of tax rates.
Overall, if this empirical analysis conrms the main drawback of inter-municipal co-
operation, i.e. a higher tax pressure, the signicance of positive e¤ects expected from a
higher inter-municipal solidarity, i.e. a convergence of scal decisions, is also questioned.
The results and evidence provided in this paper, could then be used as a starting point
for a new reexion on the impact and design of inter-municipal cooperation.
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